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Sunny and Share: Balancing Airspace
Entitlement Rights Between Solar
Energy Adopters and Their Neighbors
In an effort to ameliorate the effects of climate change, state and
local governments have made increasingly large commitments to
support solar energy adoption. For solar investments to be successful,
however, solar adopters require unobstructed access to sunlight, which
is directly at odds with the interests of neighbors and developers who
value vertical development, especially in urban centers. To mitigate these
looming conflicts, governments have enacted a variety of laws that
assign airspace entitlements to either solar adopters or their neighbors.
Unfortunately, these solutions are all poorly tailored for dense cities,
which is where future airspace conflict is likely to concentrate. In
response, this Note proposes a legal scheme designed to protect urban
solar investments without ignoring neighbors’ property interests: the
creation of solar development options (“SDOs”). Under this proposal, the
solar adopter would be entitled to unilaterally create a solar easement
across his neighbor’s airspace. But, in an important break from existing
approaches, the owner of the neighboring property would receive a call
option to retake her airspace entitlement along with an award of
transferable development rights to compensate her for the encumbrance.
The benefits of SDOs are numerous: they overcome the significant
bargaining impediments plaguing urban stakeholders, properly
compensate neighbors for valuable air rights without pricing out solar
adopters, and preserve the autonomy of local governments to flexibly
balance solar energy adoption and vertical development.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2008, a suburban spat between neighbors in Sunnyvale,
California, garnered nationwide headlines after a couple was convicted
of nuisance charges following a prolonged court battle.1 Local property
disputes are rarely so newsworthy, but the unprecedented nature of
this neighborly conflict sparked intense interest. As Carolyn Bissett,
one of the guilty homeowners, put it, “We are the first citizens in the
state of California to be convicted of a crime for growing redwood trees.”2
Bissett and her husband were prosecuted under California’s Solar
Shade Control Act, a 1978 enactment that limits the amount of shade a
property owner’s vegetation can cast over a neighbor’s solar collection
device.3
Though Bissett’s unusual predicament elicited calls for reform,
solar access remains a pressing concern in California and elsewhere.4
But the conflict is no longer limited to suburban skirmishes over
redwood trees and other vegetation. Rather, the fighting has expanded
1.
See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/science/earth/07redwood.html
[https://perma.cc/G5XW-76HX]. The homeowners were convicted in December 2007. Id. Although
a short-lived appeal was ultimately dropped due to the cost of continued litigation, the couple had
already spent an estimated $37,000 during the course of the roughly three-year fight. Id.
2.
See Paul Rogers, Sunnyvale Homeowners Told to Cut Redwoods that Block Solar Panels,
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2008, 8:33 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2008/01/23/sunnyvalehomeowners-told-to-cut-redwoods-that-block-solar-panels [https://perma.cc/YB7G-D9KE].
3.
Solar Shade Control Act, ch. 1366, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4541 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 25980–25986 (West 2018)).
4.
After Bissett’s conviction, the Act was amended to recharacterize violations as private,
rather than public, nuisances. See K.K. DuVivier, Solar Skyspace B, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
389, 402 (2014). This change is particularly problematic for plaintiffs, because the cost of bringing
a case often exceeds the cost of installing and maintaining the solar collection device. Id. The 2008
amendments also added an exemption for existing vegetation. See PUB. RES. § 25984(a); Barringer,
supra note 1. The Act, as currently written, deems planted vegetation that shades more than ten
percent of a solar area to be a private nuisance. PUB. RES. § 25982.
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to the urban battleground. In 2017, 3620 Cesar Chavez Street was an
aging commercial property5 on the fringe of San Francisco’s fastgrowing Mission District.6 In a city with a shortage of housing—
particularly affordable housing7—the lot appeared ripe for
development. Unsurprisingly, a developer soon proposed a six-story
building featuring twenty-four market-rate units.8 The city granted
multiple concessions to the project,9 and development progressed as
planned until a neighborhood meeting, hosted by the developer and the
architect, turned hostile. One neighbor worried the new building would
“rob his backyard of sunlight”; another demanded compensation
because “the solar panels on his roof would be blocked by shadows.”10
Perhaps influenced by this opposition, the proposal was scrapped, and
the property was listed for sale.11
Solar access disputes like this are not unique to California. In
cities across the country, inherent conflict has long existed between
developers who want to build taller buildings and residents who want
to preserve unobstructed views.12 What is relatively new, however, is
the increased commitment many cities have made to support the
5.
See Adam Brinklow, ‘Too Tall’ Cesar Chavez Development Asks $8 Million, CURBED S.F.
(Mar. 6, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/3/6/14834668/3620-cesar-chavez-sale
[https://perma.cc/C24T-TT94] (describing the property’s one-story office building and parking lot).
6.
Eighty years ago, the Mission District was a working-class neighborhood. Recently,
massive gentrification has sparked significant growth and development, and the area is “currently
a favorite neighborhood for Silicon Valley shuttle bus commuters.” See Mission District: The
City’s Oldest Neighborhood, BAY CITY GUIDE, http://baycityguide.com/en/mission-district/
a1JU00000002Er0MAE (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VSH7-K6GN].
7.
See Matthew Yglesias, San Francisco Just Voted to Make Housing Less Affordable, VOX
(June 4, 2014, 10:44 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/6/4/5778696/measure-b-san-francisco-willreduce-affordability [https://perma.cc/VRQ9-87HY] (discussing the scarcity of affordable housing
in San Francisco).
8.
See Joe Rivano Barros, Neighbors to Developer: Too Tall, Too Little Parking, MISSION
LOC. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://missionlocal.org/2016/08/neighbors-to-developer-too-tall-too-muchparking [https://perma.cc/NS9L-7B9M] (describing the proposed development).
9.
See Brinklow, supra note 5 (noting that the developers were “exempt from having to
complete an environmental impact report” and were “allowed to skip a Planning Commission
hearing”). The San Francisco Planning Department also exempted the project from further
environmental review otherwise required by the California Environmental Quality Act. Certificate
of Determination: Exemption from Environmental Review, Case No. 2015-009459, at 4 (Apr. 14,
2016), http://sfmea.sfplanning.org/3620%20Cesar%20Chavez%20CPE%20CertificateSIGNED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2A6-3GFZ].
10. Barros, supra note 8. Multiple neighbors demanded that the developers conduct a
“shadow study” to measure the impact of the anticipated shading, even though the city did not
require such a study in this case. Id.
11. See Brinklow, supra note 5.
12. See Emily Badger, In the Shadows of Booming Cities, a Tension Between Sunlight and
Prosperity, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2015/05/04/in-the-shadows-of-booming-cities-a-tension-between-sunlight-and-prosperity
[https://perma.cc/NL2C-2TVK] (discussing tensions stemming from vertical development in urban
centers).
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adoption of renewable energy sources as a tool for reducing carbon
emissions and combating climate change.13 The anticipated collision
between the seemingly incompatible goals of vertical development and
unfettered solar energy collection is expected to magnify disputes over
solar access and airspace rights in the coming years. To mitigate these
conflicts, municipalities will have to adopt legal frameworks that not
only protect solar energy investments but also respect neighbors’
property rights in their developable airspace.
To this end, state and local governments have considered myriad
strategies, none of which is without flaw.14 In particular, these solutions
are ill suited for city centers. It is hard to imagine that solar access
protections could actually facilitate a meaningful reduction in carbon
emissions if such policies are inoperable in the most densely populated
areas.15 Although many factors contribute to this incongruity, current
proposals are generally too costly, too restrictive of future vertical
growth, or too inconsiderate of neighbors’ property rights.16 This Note
aims to address such shortcomings by proposing the creation of solar
development options as a tool for allocating airspace rights between
rival uses. Under this Note’s proposed framework, municipalities can
protect an eligible solar adopter’s access to sunlight by unilaterally
granting an airspace easement across a neighboring property. In
exchange, the neighbor would receive a solar development option to
offset the encumbrance. This option, if exercised, would permit the
owner of the encumbered property to remove the easement for a set
price and reclaim her airspace rights. To compensate the neighbor for
the use of her airspace during the life of the easement, the option would
also be accompanied by a grant of transferable development rights that
could be sold to developers for use in specially designated receiving
areas. This proposal improves upon existing approaches and fashions a

13. For a discussion of some of these plans, see infra note 20.
14. See infra Part II for an overview of the main approaches.
15. Although solar farms provide a feasible alternative to urban siting, there are distinct
drawbacks to constructing large-scale solar installations in more remote areas. See, e.g., Matthew
M. Gorman & Anthony Marinaccio, Solar Rights and Shade in California: The Pending Conflict
Between Solar Power, Property Rights, and Environmental Protection, ALVAREZ-GLASMAN &
COLVIN 2 (May 14, 2009), http://www.agclawfirm-alerts.com/files/Solar_Rights_and_Shade_
in_California_2009_Alvarez-Glasman_Colvin_.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7L-2L3U] (highlighting
concerns that solar farms, which are often proposed in desert or wilderness areas, will impact the
natural landscape and harm wildlife habitats). In contrast, “solar energy systems integrated
within the built environment . . . confer the lowest environmental and land-use and land-cover
change impacts, reduce energetic losses from . . . transmission, and are co-located with the energy
needs of a growing population expected to be concentrated entirely in urban areas.” Rebecca R.
Hernandez, Madison K. Hoffacker & Christopher B. Field, Efficient Use of Land to Meet
Sustainable Energy Needs, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 353, 353 (2015) (footnote omitted).
16. See infra Part II for an overview of these issues.
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solution more aptly suited for urban implementation, as it
simultaneously protects investments in solar collection, compensates
neighbors for property right infringements, and encourages vertical
development in high-priority areas.
First, Part I frames the backdrop for current solar access
conflicts by tracking the origin of the clean energy movement and
outlining the soaring popularity of solar energy in recent years. It then
examines the nature of airspace conflicts and explores the traditional
legal doctrines for assigning airspace rights between neighboring
properties. Part II analyzes the existing approaches to protecting solar
access, including the prior appropriation doctrine, zoning ordinances,
solar easements, and liability rules. This Part ultimately concludes that
despite some positive features, these existing frameworks inadequately
address the unique solar access issues that arise in densely populated
cityscapes. Finally, Part III proposes the creation of solar development
options—a union between call options and transferable development
rights—and highlights how these solar options expand upon existing
liability rule regimes to better align with the unique contours of urban
property rights.
I. THE RIGHT TO LIGHT: CONFLICTING CLAIMS TO SUNLIGHT
Although environmentalism is not a modern concept, over the
past decade the environmental movement has encouraged a heightened
focus on the impact of climate change. In response to rising
temperatures, governments across the globe have increasingly turned
to renewable energy sources as one way to counteract the world’s
growing carbon footprint.17 In 2016, for example, approximately $297
17. See Paris Agreement, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/
negotiations/paris_en (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7RKC-6HWK] (giving an
overview of the binding global climate agreement). The Paris Climate Agreement was originally
adopted by 195 countries, and both Nicaragua and Syria have since signed on. Under the pact,
each signatory has agreed to submit comprehensive national climate action plans outlining carbonemission targets that support the agreement’s goal of limiting global temperatures to well below
two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. Id.; see Jonathan Ellis, The Paris Climate Deal:
What You Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/
climate/paris-climate-change-guide.html [https://perma.cc/95EE-5MG4]. For example, although
specific targets vary among member countries, the European Union has set a goal of increasing
the percentage of energy produced by renewable sources to twenty percent of all energy consumed
by 2020 and to twenty-seven percent by 2030. Climate & Energy Targets, CLIMATE ACTION
NETWORK EUR., http://www.caneurope.org/energy/climate-energy-targets (last visited Feb. 15,
2019) [https://perma.cc/RNP4-NVH5]. Even oil-rich countries have embraced the promise of clean
energy. In 2018, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund announced a $1 billion joint investment to
finance “the world’s biggest solar-power-generation project.” Margherita Stancati & Michael
Amon, Saudis, SoftBank Announce Massive Solar Power Project, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudis-softbank-group-announce-worlds-largest-solar-powerproject-1522214824 (last updated Mar. 28, 2018, 8:00 AM) [https://perma.cc/NE8C-GFYV].
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billion was spent on renewables worldwide—more than twice the
amount spent on new nuclear, coal, gas, and fuel oil power plants
combined.18 While the Trump Administration has largely scaled back
federal executive branch support for clean energy adoption,19 many
state and local governments have enacted their own measures to
facilitate the transition to renewable energy as part of a concerted effort
to create a greener society.20
This Part frames the increased popularity of renewable energy
and highlights the brewing conflicts between clean energy advocates,
other environmentalists, supporters of affordable housing, property
18. Russell Gold, Global Investment in Wind and Solar Energy Is Outshining Fossil
Fuels, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-investment-in-wind-and-solar-energy-isoutshining-fossil-fuels-1528718400 (last updated June 11, 2018, 4:59 PM) [https://perma.cc/K76CE8P3].
19. President Trump’s position on the Paris Climate Agreement left the United States as the
only country to disavow the agreement. See Brady Dennis, As Syria Embraces Paris Climate
Deal, It’s the United States Against the World, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/07/as-syria-embracesparis-climate-deal-its-the-united-states-against-the-world
[https://perma.cc/3ZD5-W4K3].
President Trump also announced a thirty-percent tariff on Chinese-made solar panels, though the
tariff’s impact is uncertain. Some have claimed that the tariff, designed to protect American solar
panel manufacturers, will have a net-negative effect on the solar market by increasing costs and
stymying the dramatic rise in panel installations, a trend that has been driven, in part, by the
falling costs of foreign-made products. See Salvador Rizzo, Trump Says Solar Tariff Will Create
‘a Lot of Jobs.’ But It Could Wipe Out Many More., WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/01/29/trump-says-solar-tariff-willcreate-a-lot-of-jobs-but-it-could-wipe-out-many-more
[https://perma.cc/A9SA-RWFP]
(interviewing solar company executives and industry analysts). The tariff’s impact is largely
dependent on the industry’s response, however. Just one week after the tariff was announced,
JinkoSolar, a leading Chinese solar panel producer, revealed plans to build a Florida plant. Jake
Novak, Trump’s Solar Tariff Gamble Pays Off – For Now, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2018, 9:28 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/31/trump-solar-tariff-scores-a-big-win-commentary.html
[https://perma.cc/KM2B-TKRF]. In addition to opening its first U.S. plant, Jinko agreed to provide
roughly seven million solar panels to NextEra Energy over the next four years. Press Release,
NextEra Energy, NextEra Energy and JinkoSolar Announce Deal for Millions of Solar Panels;
JinkoSolar to Begin Manufacturing Solar Panels in Florida (Mar. 30, 2018),
http://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com/news-and-events/news-releases/2018/03-30-2018151037810 [https://perma.cc/VK5Z-QBF5].
20. See Steven Mufson, These Titans of Industry Just Broke with Trump’s Decision to Exit the
Paris Accords, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/06/01/these-titans-of-industry-just-broke-with-trumps-decision-to-exit-theparis-accords [https://perma.cc/SDK7-KMVH] (“About 30 states have adopted mandates for
utilities to increase their use of renewable energy, standards that will not change with Trump’s
withdrawal from the Paris accord or his effort to nullify the Clean Power Plan.”). For example,
New York governor Andrew Cuomo unveiled a plan to invest $1.5 billion in renewable energy, and
the California State Senate voted to require utilities to use one hundred percent renewable
energy by 2045. Id.; see also Renewable Energy, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION 1,
http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/tracking_progress/documents/renewable.pdf (last updated
Dec. 2018) [https://perma.cc/U42R-95ZR] (describing California’s goal of ensuring that renewable
energy sources account for sixty percent of retail energy sales by 2030); The Energy to Lead: 2015
New York State Energy Plan, N.Y. ST., https://energyplan.ny.gov/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/2BWF-W8UA] (outlining New York’s goal of providing fifty percent of electricity
from renewable sources).
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owners, and developers. First, Section I.A reviews clean energy growth
in the United States, concentrating on small-scale solar development.
Section I.B then highlights some of the conflicts, both present and
anticipated, between solar energy adopters and their opponents.
Finally, Section I.C examines the property interests implicated by the
proliferation of solar energy systems.
A. The Growth of Clean Energy
The call for widespread adoption and integration of clean energy
is not a new one. Early efforts were motivated, however, less by
environmental sustainability and more by geopolitical concerns. In fact,
a majority of current state solar access laws were enacted in response
to oil embargoes in the 1970s.21 That economic crisis, and the
corresponding price shocks it produced, sparked heightened interest in
renewable energy, and many state governments responded in kind.22
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, twenty-nine states had promulgated
legislation—and thirty-two states had instituted financial-incentive
programs—addressing solar energy access and adoption.23 But once oil
prices settled, both federal and local governmental support eroded.24
Consequently, renewable energy remained a relative afterthought until
crude oil experienced another price hike in the 2000s, reigniting public
interest in nontraditional energy production.25 This time, the federal
government26 made strong commitments that more firmly cemented its
support for renewable sources.27
21. Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 851, 857.
22. Id.
23. See DuVivier, supra note 4, at 397–98 (reviewing law review articles from this time period
to develop an overview of state responses to solar energy).
24. See id. at 410–11 (“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, twenty-seven cities or counties had
some sort of solar access regulation, law, or ordinance that gained more than regional attention.
Shockingly, thirteen, or almost half of the twenty-seven originally enacted, are now amended,
repealed, or simply cannot be found.” (footnotes omitted)); Rule, supra note 21, at 857 (noting that
as “conventional energy prices settled . . . federal solar subsidies disappeared”).
25. Rule, supra note 21, at 857; see also Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart,
MACROTRENDS, http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart (last visited Feb.
15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8PPX-B2FW].
26. Although legislative efforts have been largely concentrated in state governments, federal
support is an important driver of solar investment. Financial incentives and tax credits can
accelerate solar adoption by making panel installation more affordable, yet many states lack the
necessary budget flexibility to support such programs. Indeed, eleven states have repealed their
solar incentives, originally enacted in response to the oil embargo, which one commentator has
suggested may be attributed to a “lack of funding.” DuVivier, supra note 4, at 399 n.46.
27. See Rule, supra note 21, at 857. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a
federal tax credit for residential solar. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1335(a),
119 Stat. 594, 1033–36 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 25D (2012)). This tax credit has been
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Currently, a majority of states (and some municipalities) protect
or incentivize solar energy production to varying degrees.28 And as
research continues to emphasize the connection between air pollution
and climate change, the scientific community almost unanimously
supports clean energy development.29 The alignment of government
actors and academics with commercial stakeholders has firmly
entrenched the fledgling solar power industry in the domestic
landscape, as evidenced by exponential market growth over the past
decade.30 Solar energy accounted for forty percent of all new electrical
generating capacity in 2016;31 by the end of 2020, it is expected to
constitute over three percent of total U.S. electrical generation.32
Besides being “cleaner” than traditional fossil fuels, solar has some
comparative advantages over other renewable energy sources33 and has
amended and extended multiple times, most recently in 2018. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 40402(a), 132 Stat. 64. From a more policy-driven perspective, the U.S.
Department of Energy created the Solar America Board for Codes and Standards (“Solar ABCs”)
in 2007. Rule, supra note 21, at 857. In 2008, Solar ABCs issued a comprehensive report examining
then-existing solar access laws, outlining best practices, and proposing a model statute. Id. For
more information on Solar ABCs, see SOLAR AM. BOARD FOR CODES & STANDARDS,
http://www.solarabcs.org/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YU7P-YGCZ].
28. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 12:4 (2018) (noting that some states have legislatively provided for solar easements by
recognizing the validity of private agreements between landowners); Solar Rights and
Easements by State, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., https://www.caionline.org/Advocacy/
StateAdvocacy/PriorityIssues/SolarRestrictions/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/62FF-3YUU] (noting that twenty-five states have solar access laws that preclude
homeowners’ associations from preventing or unreasonably restricting solar panel installations,
that fifteen states recognize solar easements, and that only ten states do not offer legal protection
for solar panels).
29. See generally Clean Energy, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/
clean-energy (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J24Z-GGW3] (advocating for a shift from
coal and natural gas to wind and solar power and noting that renewable energy could provide up
to eighty percent of U.S. electricity by 2050).
30. Over this time period, solar energy has experienced an average annual growth rate of
fifty-nine percent. Solar Industry Research Data, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N,
https://www.seia.org/solar-industry-data (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/23JZHM93]. This trend extends back even further. See Rule, supra note 21, at 854 (noting that the
generating capacity of solar installations in 2008 was triple the amount installed in 2005 and more
than ten times the amount installed in 2000).
31. See Solar Industry Research Data, supra note 30 (discussing the rapid pace of solar
growth).
32. See John Weaver, EIA: Wind and Solar Will Be Fastest Growing Sources of Electricity in
2019 and 2020, PV MAG. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2019/01/21/wind-and-solarstill-fast-growing-electricity-sources-in-contracting-markets-of-2019-2020
[https://perma.cc/WVN6-JT5C].
33. See DuVivier, supra note 4, at 390 (discussing the benefits of solar panels as compared to
hydropower and industrial-scale solar thermoelectric power); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green
Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 273 (2011) (noting that commercial wind projects have been
opposed in rural areas due to “their potential to disrupt migratory bird populations, military radar
systems, and competing wind farms” (footnotes omitted)). There has been some support, however,
for small on-site wind generation turbines. For a discussion of some obstacles facing wind energy
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benefitted from decreased costs in both the utility- and small-scale solar
markets.34
While solar energy’s ascent can certainly be attributed to these
economic drivers, its increased popularity is not solely a byproduct of
market factors. A number of states—including, importantly,
California35—have taken more proactive approaches to accelerate solar
energy adoption. With the passage of the Solar Shade Control Act in
1978,36 California became one of the first states to recognize
comprehensive solar access rights.37 More recently, California passed a
series of legislative proposals that, among other things, target a
reduction in the state’s greenhouse emissions to forty percent below
1990 levels by 2030,38 require one hundred percent of the state’s
electricity to come from carbon-free sources by 2045,39 ensure all new
installations, as well as an overview of measures taken by more supportive jurisdictions, see Edna
Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green Building, Energy Efficiency, and
Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 26–28 (2008).
34. See David Roberts, The Falling Costs of US Solar Power, in 7 Charts, VOX (Aug. 24, 2016,
1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/24/12620920/us-solar-power-costsfalling [https://perma.cc/
9ZS8-6RED] (discussing the expansion of solar power and its rapidly decreasing costs). Installation
costs have decreased by an estimated seventy percent in recent years. See Kaya Laterman, Is New
York Ready for Solar Power?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/
02/realestate/is-new-york-ready-for-solar-power.html [https://perma.cc/RF3T-BDQU] (evaluating
solar power’s growing foothold in New York City).
35. Discussions of solar energy adoption and the general approach to combating climate
change are incomplete without a focus on California. California is motivated to take an active role
in addressing carbon emissions, due in no small part to it having the worst air quality in the
country. See Shanika Gunaratna, This State Has the Worst Air Quality in the Nation, CBS NEWS
(June 20, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/worst-air-quality-california/ [https://perma.cc/
3SGU-FDHY] (noting that, according to the American Lung Association, more than ninety percent
of California residents live in counties with unhealthy air). Critically, California’s green policies
also have a massive effect on the global market. In 2017, California’s $2.7 trillion economy was the
fifth largest in the world, trailing only the United States, China, Japan, and Germany. See Lisa
Marie Segarra, California’s Economy Is Now Bigger than All of the U.K., FORTUNE (May 5, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/05/05/california-fifth-biggest-economy-passes-united-kingdom
[https://perma.cc/K7TE-YM4C].
36. Solar Shade Control Act, ch. 1366, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4541 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 25980–25986 (West 2018)). For a discussion of the Act, including its provisions and
impact, see supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
37. A “solar access right” is a landowner’s legally recognized interest in restricting the use of
his neighbor’s airspace to ensure continued, unobstructed access to sunlight. For a discussion of
the various legal theories underlying this concept, see infra Section I.C. For a discussion of the
different stances that states have taken toward solar access rights, see infra Part II.
38. Chris Megerian & Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Signs Sweeping Legislation to Combat
Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-cajerry-brown-signs-climate-laws-20160908-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/NUW8-8M8P].
39. Ivan Penn, California Lawmakers Set Goal for Carbon-Free Energy by 2045, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/business/energy-environment/californiaclean-energy.html [https://perma.cc/7FFY-EXRR]. This constitutes an aggressive acceleration by
the California legislature. The state had previously enacted legislation requiring at least
fifty percent of electricity to come from carbon-free sources by 2030. Ivan Penn, California
Will
Require Solar Power
for New Homes, N.Y. TIMES
(May
9,
2018),
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homes are net-zero energy by 2020,40 and mandate solar panel
installation on newly constructed homes beginning in 2020.41
California’s local governments have, in many cases, followed this lead
and adopted aggressive measures to facilitate clean energy production.
San Francisco, for example, expanded on the state’s then-current “solar
ready” policy and enacted the Better Roofs Ordinance, requiring solar
devices to be installed on fifteen percent of the roof space on most new
buildings.42 Although California has taken one of the most proactive
approaches to solar adoption, it is not alone. New York has also seen
increased demand for commercial and residential solar power, due in
part to the ambitious policies set forth by state and local officials.43
Indeed, after New York governor Andrew M. Cuomo called for half of
the state’s electricity to come from renewable sources by 2030, New
York City went even further, aiming for an eighty-percent reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.44 Through a combination of
legislative support; falling installation costs; and federal, state, and
local incentives, the number of residential solar projects across New
York City’s five boroughs skyrocketed from only 186 in 2011 to more
than 5,300 in 2016.45

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/business/energy-environment/california-solar-power.html
[https://perma.cc/EA44-Z4KD].
40. Katherine Tweed, California Wants All New Homes to Be Net Zero in 2020, GREENTECH
MEDIA (June 10, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/California-Wants-All-NewHomes-to-be-Net-Zero-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/49HA-V5X4].
41. James Rainey, California Becomes First State to Require Solar Panels on New Homes,
NBC NEWS (May 9, 2018, 2:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-becomesfirst-state-require-solar-panels-new-homes-n872531 [https://perma.cc/MMV4-D3ZE]. The new
standards “apply to single-family homes and to apartment and condominium complexes of three
stories or less.” Id. Previously, California law required fifteen percent of the roof area on all newly
built small- and mid-sized buildings to be “solar ready” (i.e., unshaded by the proposed building
itself and free from other obtrusions). Scott Wiener, Let’s Require Solar Panels on New Buildings
in California, MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2017), https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/lets-require-solarpanels-on-all-new-buildings-in-california-cb18fe9d9ec4 [https://perma.cc/6A4H-3ZRG].
42. Zoning Administrator Bulletin No. 11: Better Roofs Ordinance, S.F. PLAN. DEP’T 1 (Apr.
2017),
http://default.sfplanning.org/publications_reports/ZAB_11_Better%20Roofs_051517.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CQ7-Y6ZB]. Pursuant to the Better Roofs Ordinance, developers have the
option of instead dedicating thirty percent of the roof space to living roof (i.e., green or vegetated
roof) or incorporating a combination of both solar and living roof elements. Id. The American
Planning Association recognized the Better Roofs Ordinance as 2018’s best “Sustainable Policy,
Law, or Tool.” Press Release, S.F. Planning Dep’t, San Francisco Planning’s Better Roofs
Ordinance Receives National Recognition for Excellence in Sustainability (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://sf-planning.org/article/san-francisco-planning’s-better-roofs-ordinance-receives-nationalrecognition-excellence [https://perma.cc/MR25-G52T].
43. Laterman, supra note 34.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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B. Conflicts over Airspace
While unified efforts from multiple stakeholders have created
sustained interest in renewable energy, the greater prevalence of
residential solar panels heightens the risk of airspace conflict. Given
inherent inefficiencies in the capacity of current photovoltaic
technology,46 solar energy production is highly sensitive to shifting solar
access.47 Shading by a neighboring tree or structure of as little as four
percent of a solar panel can greatly reduce the panel’s efficiency and, in
some cases, may even incapacitate the entire array of panels.48
Unsurprisingly, once a property owner has undertaken the oftensubstantial investment49 necessary to install a solar energy system, he
is particularly sensitive to potential obstructions that could impede his
capital recovery.50
Although the precise substance of neighborly disagreements
varies tremendously, most solar disputes stem from conflicting land use
preferences. Consider the following hypothetical. Homeowner A has
installed an array of solar panels, which, at the time of installation, has
unobstructed access to sunlight. One year later, however, Neighbor B
purchases the adjacent parcel and wants to plant trees along her
property line or, alternatively, add a second story to her home. These
proposed uses will shade Homeowner A’s solar array, severely limiting
the panels’ energy production and preventing Homeowner A from
realizing a return on his initial capital outlay. Consequently, either
46. Photovoltaic technology refers to the process through which solar cells convert sunlight
into electricity. Solar Photovoltaic Technology Basics, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY,
https://www.nrel.gov/research/re-photovoltaics.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
RW8Y-LYMA]. Its technical details are beyond the scope of this Note.
47. See DuVivier, supra note 4, at 392.
48. Id. at 393. This problem is magnified by the fact that panels are often wired along a single
circuit to limit costs. As a result, if one panel is shaded and thus unable to generate energy, the
entire array of panels may be compromised. Id.
49. Accounting for applicable tax credits, the average cost of a six-kilowatt system in 2019 is
$12,810. Sara Matasci, How Much Do Solar Panels Cost in the U.S. in 2019?, ENERGYSAGE (Feb.
1, 2019), https://news.energysage.com/how-much-does-the-average-solar-panel-installation-costin-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/V92A-65W9]. The actual cost can vary significantly from state to
state, however. For example, even after applying incentives and tax credits, a forty-panel roof
array cost a New York couple $41,800. The couple paid $5,000 upfront but had to take out two
loans to pay off the outstanding bill. Laterman, supra note 34. Similarly, the average cost to install
a residential solar panel array in Massachusetts is between $30,000 and $45,000. See David E.
Missirian, Let the Sun Shine In: An Examination of Solar Easements and a Proposed Statute, 41
REAL EST. L.J. 303, 310 (2012).
50. Even when a solar energy system is able to operate unobstructed, it typically takes at
least several years of power generation before the owner is able to fully recoup the upfront costs.
Troy A. Rule, Legislating for Solar Access: A Guide and Model Ordinance 7 (Apr. 2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530088
[https://perma.cc/65VR-L9YK].
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Homeowner A or Neighbor B must concede his or her preferred use—it
is impossible for both to enjoy their properties as desired. Indeed,
versions of this exact dispute have arisen from California51 to
Washington, D.C.,52 to Australia.53 These ex post conflicts over
competing land use choices directly implicate issues of as-of-right
development and the assignment of legal entitlements.54
Some conflicts, however, are motivated less by incompatible use
and more by aesthetic considerations.55 For example, homeowners’
associations (“HOAs”) and subdivision developers may explicitly
prohibit solar energy systems—or at least make it so difficult to install
a compliant system as to render solar collection infeasible—purely
because solar panels are considered a blight on neighborhood
character.56 Even where such restrictions are drafted “with financial
gain, not solar access, in mind,” they can still pose a meaningful barrier
to solar adoption.57
While neighbors and developers are easily anticipated sources of
conflict for solar adopters, another potential opponent may be less
obvious: environmentalists. Although the environmental community
51. See Barringer, supra note 1 (discussing a California lawsuit in which a couple was
successfully sued under the California Shade Control Act after their redwood trees shaded their
neighbor’s solar panel, even though the trees had been planted prior to the installation of the
panels).
52. See Ian Shapira, It’s Pop-Ups vs. Solar Panels on Shepherd Street NW in Columbia
Heights, WASH. POST (July 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/its-pop-ups-vssolar-panels-on-shepherd-street-nw-in-columbia-heights/2014/07/20/ae8f9f56-0dd8-11e4-b8e5d0de80767fc2_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6P9-6MW6] (discussing a dispute between
developers and residents over the construction of pop-up row houses that would potentially block
existing solar panels from sunlight access).
53. See Damien Carrick & Tegan Osborne, Solar Panels and the Law: Can You Stop Your
Neighbour from Blocking Your Sunlight?, ABC NEWS: L. REP. (May 17, 2017, 11:54 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-16/solar-panels-and-the-law-is-there-a-right-to-sunlight/
8526752 [https://perma.cc/32VC-BB72] (discussing a dispute between neighbors over the
construction of a four-story building that would shade both solar collectors and a community
garden).
54. In the hypothetical concerning Homeowner A and Neighbor B, deciding who has the
prevailing legal entitlement plays an enormous role in adjudicating the dispute. If Neighbor B
enjoys the legal right to use the airspace within the boundaries of her property, Homeowner A has
the Herculean task of overcoming this initial allocation of legal rights in arguing that he has a
right to restrict Neighbor B’s use, in furtherance of his solar access.
55. While the underlying conflict here can still be characterized as one of competing uses (i.e.,
the right to use solar energy versus the right to a view devoid of solar panels), it can be resolved
without forcing one of the landowners to completely abandon his or her preferred land use.
56. See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1232–33 (2009) (discussing the
use of restrictive covenants to ensure aesthetic uniformity in developments, often at the expense
of solar collection); Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223,
1241 (noting that numerous HOAs have “adopted provisions that prohibit or severely restrict
installation” of solar devices). Many states, however, have legislatively restrained the use of
covenants as a mechanism for inhibiting solar energy systems. Bronin, supra, at 1232–33.
57. Bronin, supra note 56, at 1232.
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widely prefers solar energy to fossil fuels, alternative land uses may, at
times, provide a greener net outcome than solar installations.58 To
illustrate, the energy savings realized (e.g., from reduced air
conditioning use) from planting tall shade trees near a large commercial
building may outpace the energy generation of a small residential solar
panel next door.59 Accordingly, the trees would actually account for a
greater net reduction in traditional energy consumption.
Environmental concerns regarding solar energy also exist on a
broader policy level. In particular, some environmentalists worry that
limiting vertical growth to protect solar access will have the perverse
effect of promoting urban sprawl, which will consequently lead to
increased energy consumption.60 The benefits of sprawl reduction can
be significant: concentrating housing in urban centers allows workers
to reduce commute times and take advantage of shared municipal
services.61 In fact, one study estimated that the addition of ten thousand
new housing units in downtown San Francisco would actually be three
times more effective at reducing carbon emissions than a policy
requiring solar panels on all buildings.62 Cities across the country are
increasingly confronting this tension: Protect solar installations from
shade by restricting vertical development, or reduce urban sprawl by
encouraging dense urban infill?63
58. See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803,
825 (2013) (noting that the installation of solar panels at the expense of shade trees may lead to
“suboptimal use of the airspace at issue”); Gorman & Marinaccio, supra note 15, at 1 (providing
examples of “solar spats,” in which both parties consider themselves to be environmentalists).
While this Note is primarily focused on small-scale solar installations, environmental concerns
have also been raised regarding the construction of utility-scale solar farms. See supra note 15.
59. Rule, supra note 58, at 825.
60. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 33, at 289 (“Sprawling development on the suburban fringe . . .
can also result in . . . greater energy consumption.”); Jesse L. Matuson, Note, A Legislative
Approach to Solar Access: Transferable Development Rights, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 835, 868 (1978)
(“The result of massively reducing densities so that there will be no shading of a neighbor’s
property, would be greater urban sprawl and increased energy waste.”); Rule, supra note 50
(manuscript at 12) (noting that in densely populated urban areas, permitting vertical growth can
be an important strategy to combat sprawl).
61. See Rule, supra note 33, at 289 (noting that dense urban infill projects tend to require
less public infrastructure and result in shorter commutes as compared to suburban projects). But
see Badger, supra note 12 (discussing the loss of sunlight that can result from urban
concentration).
62. Brad Plumer, San Francisco Is Requiring Solar Panels on All New Buildings. But Here’s
a Much Greener Idea., VOX (Apr. 20, 2016, 1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/20/
11467110/san-francisco-solar-density [https://perma.cc/M5HJ-VJJG] (comparing estimates of
carbon-emission reductions attributed to the two proposals).
63. See Badger, supra note 12. New York City has proposed adding eighty thousand units of
affordable housing over the next ten years, while Boston has proposed an additional fifty-three
thousand units. Id.; see also Rule, supra note 56, at 1224 (“Distributed renewable energy is vital
to curbing energy sprawl[,] . . . [but a]s small-scale wind and solar power systems grow ever more
cost-efficient, neighborhood battles over them will only increase.”).
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C. The Origins of Airspace Rights
As discussed previously, the increased emphasis on solar energy
development has ignited intense debate among competing
stakeholders.64 But before addressing the various proposals that
attempt to bridge this divide, it is important to understand the doctrinal
underpinnings of airspace rights. The issue of airspace allocation and
use is neither novel nor simple. Historically, the centrality of
agriculture in society necessitated that a majority of airspace be treated
as public commons to ensure adequate sunlight for crop growth.65 As
society shifted away from the concept of common airspace, however, two
competing principles emerged.
First, the ad coelum doctrine recognizes property rights in
airspace based on terrestrial parcel boundaries.66 Simply put, a
landowner owns the airspace directly above her property. This doctrine
gained popularity throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
and became the prevailing theory in U.S. common law.67 The U.S.
Supreme Court finally adopted the ad coelum approach in United States
v. Causby, when it held that regular and repeated incursions into
airspace above private land could constitute a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.68
The second principle, which provides a limited exception to the
ad coelum approach, is the English common law doctrine of ancient
lights.69 Under the ancient lights doctrine, an individual’s long-term
enjoyment of sunlight constitutes sufficient grounds for the creation of
a prescriptive easement that indirectly limits the height of neighboring
buildings.70 The easement ossifies the individual’s legal right to
continued unobstructed solar access.71 The doctrine of ancient lights,
however, has been completely rejected in the United States.72
64. See supra Section I.B.
65. See Rule, supra note 33, at 278.
66. Id. at 278–79. The full Latin phrase, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, dates to
the 1300s and translates as: “[To] whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky.” Id. at 278
(alteration in original).
67. Id. at 278–79.
68. 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). There exists, however, a navigable public commons for aviation
above which the subjacent property owner has no claim. Id. at 263.
69. See Rule, supra note 33, at 278.
70. See John William Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Approaches for Access
to Sunlight, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982); Rule, supra note 33, at 278.
71. See Gergacz, supra note 70, at 6; Rule, supra note 33, at 278.
72. See Gergacz, supra note 70, at 6 (noting that while a few state courts permitted
prescriptive easements in the nineteenth century, this was a minority position and has since been
repudiated). Professor Gergacz attributes this rejection to the fact that “prescriptive creation was
unsuitable for rapidly growing, ever-changing conditions in communities which existed in the
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Given the clear judicial adoption of the ad coelum doctrine—and
the corresponding rejection of ancient lights—traditional airspace
rights and the associated legal entitlements certainly seem to cut
against the solar adopter, at least at common law. Under an ad coelum
regime, rights in the airspace above one’s parcel are firmly protected,
and a solar adopter has no cognizable claim to make use of his
neighbor’s airspace for a competing purpose. Because no prescriptive
right exists, neighboring property owners are free to develop their
airspace to the extent permitted by law, regardless of whether doing so
will effectively block sunlight from adjacent parcels. The absence of
common law protection means property owners seeking to guard their
solar investments against obstruction from neighboring parcels must
rely on voluntary market transactions or legislatively enacted
solutions.73 This latter option remains possible under the ad coelum
doctrine because landowners’ common law rights are not absolute—
local governments’ power to regulate the use of airspace has long been
accepted.74
II. UP IN THE AIR: ALLOCATING AIRSPACE ENTITLEMENTS
Over the past forty years, states have enacted a variety of
legislation to address the conflicting land use policies implicated by
solar energy collection.75 Despite the wide range of experimental
approaches, no generally accepted policy has emerged. This lack of legal
uniformity has been cited as one explanation for solar energy’s ongoing
struggle to attain even greater market penetration.76 But the failure to
settle on a comprehensive policy for the allocation and protection of
airspace rights between landowners is not surprising—each proposal
has clear drawbacks. Moreover, individual communities’ specialized
needs make it exceedingly difficult to formulate a proposal that is not
United States” and the fact that the mere enjoyment of sunlight that flowed across a neighboring
property did not constitute adverse use. Id. at 6–7.
73. A potential judicial remedy may exist in very limited circumstances. Notably, despite
clearly rejecting solar prescriptive easements, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that private
nuisance—based on the reasonable use doctrine—established a claim for relief by the owner of a
solar-heated residence to enjoin his neighbor’s proposed construction. See Prah v. Maretti, 321
N.W.2d 182, 191 (Wis. 1982).
74. For example, local governments may impose use restrictions, building setbacks, and
zoning ordinances. For a discussion of various state regulatory approaches, see BRUCE & ELY,
supra note 28, § 12:4; Bronin, supra note 56, at 1237–50.
75. See DuVivier, supra note 4, at 397–414, for an overview of early state solar access
legislation as well as a discussion of the subsequent erosion of some such protections.
76. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1220 (“At least in part because of the muddled legal regime,
and despite numerous technological advances that have reduced the cost of solar collectors, only
one percent of our nation’s energy currently comes from the sun.”).
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only broad in its application but also tailored in its approach to local
concerns.77
This Part highlights the benefits of some existing regulatory
approaches and identifies the key deficiencies of these plans. First,
Sections II.A and II.B introduce the prior appropriation doctrine and
solar zoning, respectively. Both schemes modify the neighboring
property owner’s legal entitlement by restricting her ability to use her
airspace, thereby ensuring unobstructed sunlight for the solar collector.
Other jurisdictions, however, have attempted to legislate solar access
not by altering the contours of the legal entitlement but rather by
changing how that entitlement is protected. While no model is without
flaw, many scholars appear to favor a liability rule approach over a
property rule approach, as outlined by Judge Calabresi and Professor
Melamed in their 1972 Cathedral Model.78 Property rules contemplate
that the legal entitlement at stake will change hands only as a result of
voluntary bargaining between the interested parties.79 Solar
easements, discussed in Section II.C, provide a clear illustration of such
a property rule approach as applied to solar access. In contrast, liability
rules facilitate involuntary transactions between landowners by
permitting one party to purchase the legal entitlement at a price set by
a third-party appraiser.80 Section II.D examines Iowa’s liability rule
system. Ultimately, this Part concludes that while a liability rule is
preferable to a property rule to balance the interests of the solar adopter
against his neighbor, current liability rule proposals are still ill suited
for resolving conflicts in the setting most likely to generate airspace
disputes: dense urban cores.81

77. See Rule, supra note 56, at 1250–53 (discussing the benefits of individualized regulation
and the drawbacks of preempting local power over distributed renewables).
78. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 21, at 891 (recommending a liability rule approach to solar
entitlements). See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (articulating
the concept of liability rules and their counterpart, property rules). Simply put, the Cathedral
Model involves a determination of who should hold a scarce legal “entitlement” and whether to
protect that entitlement with a property rule or a liability rule. Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at
1093. Under the Cathedral Model, there are four possible outcomes of a solar energy airspace
dispute: (1) the entitlement is held by the solar adopter and protected by a property rule; (2) the
entitlement is held by the solar adopter and protected by a liability rule; (3) the entitlement is held
by the neighbor and protected by a property rule; and (4) the entitlement is held by the neighbor
and protected by a liability rule. For a general overview of the Cathedral Model, including a
discussion of how it corresponds to solar access, see Rule, supra note 21, at 858–61.
79. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 78, at 1106–10.
80. A liability rule approach allows the party that was not initially awarded the entitlement
to purchase the entitlement at a price equal to its objective value, as determined by a third party.
Id.
81. See supra Section I.B.
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A. Prior Appropriation Doctrine
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, an individual obtains a
legal right of use by becoming the first person to physically appropriate
a particular resource and put that resource to a beneficial use.82 This
doctrine was originally intended to settle disputes over water rights but
has since been extended to govern the initial allocation of entitlements
to other resources. Accordingly, a solar adopter can protect his solar
access by unilaterally obtaining a “solar right” based on his first-in-time
beneficial use of the sunlight.83 Prior appropriation doctrine has not,
however, been widely applied to solar access issues; New Mexico and
Wyoming are the only states to explicitly adopt this approach.84 Under
these states’ general statutory frameworks, a landowner may acquire a
solar right—essentially a restrictive easement across his neighbor’s
property—if he installs a qualifying solar device and complies with
various ministerial recordation and notice requirements.85 The
landowner does “not ‘own’ the sunlight, but ha[s] a right to divert it for
a beneficial use.”86 This aggressive model of allocating legal
entitlements strongly favors the solar adopter but conversely ignores
the neighbor’s property rights in her own airspace.87
Massachusetts and Wisconsin have similar statutes that, while
not explicitly incorporating prior appropriation, “give rise to the same
practical consequences.”88 Although Massachusetts and Wisconsin do
not recognize a solar right predicated upon first use, both establish
“permit” systems that enable local jurisdictions to issue solar rights

82. See
Prior
Appropriation
Law,
COLO.
DIVISION
WATER
RESOURCES,
http://water.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/SWRights/Pages/PriorApprop.aspx (last visited Feb. 16,
2019) [https://perma.cc/W6P7-75N5]. The doctrine is commonly known as “first in time, first in
right.” In the water-use context, the first person to apply the water to some type of beneficial use
has the first right to use that water within a particular stream. Id. For example, consider two
farmers whose properties sit atop an underwater aquifer. Both landowners have a claim to the
water, and it is easy to imagine conflicts over the apportionment of this water supply, especially
during droughts. In this scenario, prior appropriation doctrine makes more sense—the first
landowner to put the water to beneficial use becomes the senior right holder over the aquifer,
ensuring that in the event of a shortage, his needs will be prioritized. Id.
83. See Rule, supra note 33, at 310.
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103 (2018). Under both
statutes, the solar rights are freely transferrable once granted. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103. Wyoming exempts certain de minimus obstructions and sets limits on
where the solar collector can be placed, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-104, and New Mexico provides a
process through which the solar right can be contested, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-9(C).
85. Rule, supra note 33, at 310.
86. DuVivier, supra note 4, at 420.
87. See supra Section I.C (discussing background principles of a landowner’s airspace rights).
88. Rule, supra note 33, at 311; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 9B (2018); WIS. STAT.
§ 66.0403 (2018).
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permits upon application by solar adopters.89 Like the statutory
schemes in New Mexico and Wyoming, the permitting process grants
what effectively amounts to a negative easement90 over adjacent
property.91
Prior appropriation doctrine—including the permitting
variation—has incited criticism from legal commentators. First, the
relevant statutory systems do not provide a compensatory mechanism
for the burdened neighbor. Because the neighboring landowner held
legal title to the now-encumbered airspace prior to the recognition of
the solar right, many commentators have suggested this approach may
effect a violation of the Takings Clause.92
Further, the analogy between physical resources—like water,
oil, and natural gas—and sunlight is inherently strained. Because the
“supply” of sunlight is infinite, solar energy production should not, at
least in theory, implicate the same rival-use concerns93 as would a
dispute over physical resources.94 Indeed, the conflicts in this setting
are “rarely disputes over competing solar access easements” and
instead pit solar users against neighbors who have “no interest in
installing solar collectors” and “who seek only to preserve existing
airspace rights.”95 Plainly put, “the resource at issue in these conflicts
89. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 9B; WIS. STAT. § 66.0403. The local agency has more
discretion in granting a permit than it would under a strict prior appropriation approach. For
example, under Wisconsin law, the agency may deny a solar permit request if, at the
administrative hearing, a neighbor demonstrates that she has present plans to build a structure
that would create an “impermissible interference.” WIS. STAT. § 66.0403(5)(a)(2). Some cities have
also enacted unique permitting regimes in the absence of statewide policy. See Bronin, supra note
56, at 1240 (discussing permit programs in Portland, Oregon; Ashland, Oregon; and Boulder,
Colorado).
90. The owner of a negative easement may “prevent the possessor of the land from doing acts
upon it which, were it not for the easement, [the possessor] would be privileged to do.”
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 452 (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
91. Once a permit is granted under Wisconsin’s scheme, “[a]ny person who uses property
which he or she owns or permits any other person to use the property in a way which creates an
impermissible interference . . . shall be liable to the permit holder or applicant for damages.” WIS.
STAT. § 66.0403(7)(a).
92. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 56, at 1242 (“[T]he possibility of takings claims presents a
real challenge to the wide-scale enactment of solar permitting systems.”); Gergacz, supra note 70,
at 15 (“[T]he New Mexico Act ignores the property rights of adjoining landowners in a manner
which may violate the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.”). But see Peter R.
Mounsey, Comment, Solar Access Rights in Wyoming, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 437 (1984)
(concluding that the Wyoming statute is not a taking but noting the issues are still uncertain and
“a challenge to some local government’s solar access scheme would seem inevitable”). The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. Rivalry concerns are implicated when consumption by one party necessarily reduces the
ability of another party to consume that same good.
94. See generally Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 465–
74 (2014) (discussing the historic treatment of oil and gas interests under property law).
95. Rule, supra note 21, at 877.
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is not sunlight but airspace.”96 And despite the fact that the doctrine
assigns the initial entitlement based on first use by a solar adopter, the
neighbor will nearly always be “first in time” with respect to the
airspace because she already has property rights to that airspace under
common law.97
B. Zoning
In light of the inherent inequity stemming from a solar access
approach that conceptualizes sunlight as a finite resource, some
jurisdictions have attempted to craft a more democratic solution to solar
access problems. Indeed, local governments have utilized their general
zoning power to enact broad-reaching solar access protections.98 Even
though solar access zoning falls within the accepted limits of the state’s
police power,99 only thirteen states explicitly authorize the practice, and
a few more have weaker provisions that contemplate solar access but
are not explicitly incorporated into zoning mandates.100 Within the
zoning context, Professor Sara Bronin posits two ways in which
localities might protect solar rights: (1) by granting variances,
exceptions, and other individualized determinations or (2) by creating
new “solar zones.”101 Variances, exceptions, and the like operate the
same as under conventional zoning schemes, without required

96. Rule, supra note 33, at 311.
97. Id.; Rule, supra note 21, at 877.
98. See Matuson, supra note 60, at 846 (“The power to zone is derived from the police power
of the state and is delegated to local governments by means of enabling legislation.”); Rule, supra
note 56, at 1227 (noting that most states have empowered local land use regulation by enacting
versions of the State Zoning Enabling Act). Zoning ordinances face three constitutional
requirements: they “must bear a rational relationship to the health, morals or general welfare of
the community” to comply with due process standards; they must not be so “arbitrary and
discriminatory” to be a denial of equal protection; and they must not “reduce the value of land as
to constitute a taking” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Matuson, supra note 60, at 846.
99. The authority to zone for solar access under state enabling statutes is thought to emanate
from provisions authorizing localities “to provide for ‘safety, morals or general welfare’ and
‘adequate light and air.’ ” Bronin, supra note 56, at 1242 (citing multiple scholars for this
proposition).
100. Id. at 1243–44 (noting that a few states require solar access to be considered during the
design of ordinances and comprehensive plans). Some states take an alternative approach and,
rather than mandate solar access zoning, prohibit localities from affirmatively inhibiting solar
installation. Id. at 1244. For an overview of state zoning enabling statutes, see id. at 1243–44,
1243 n.107, which highlights Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
101. Id. at 1245.
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consideration of the unique problems presented by solar access
conflicts.102
Solar zoning, on the other hand, provides added flexibility,
because a locality can establish solar rights either “as of right or by
individual petition.”103 Consider, for example, approaches to solar
zoning in Boulder, Colorado, and Ashland, Oregon. Boulder’s
comprehensive policy, which has elicited praise from commentators,104
comprises “solar envelopes”105 and “solar fences”106 that are tailored to
function in tandem across the city’s three “Solar Access Areas.”107 In
effect, Boulder’s zoning has produced a coordinated interplay of setback
and height restrictions that limit both density and vertical
development. Ashland, by comparison, adopted similar solar setback
requirements but supplemented this “as of right” zoning with
“individual petitions” in the form of a solar access permit system to
address shade created by vegetation.108
Solar zoning, when done well, has clear benefits. First, it places
the specific siting decisions in the hands of local communities, who are
often “in a better position than state officials to estimate the likely costs
of distributed renewables within their jurisdictions.”109 Second, the
general population may consider the outcome more equitable compared
to a system that assigns entitlements based on first use or permit

102. Id. In general, these individualized determinations require landowners to petition a local
municipal body for permission to use their property in a way that is not permitted as of right by
the zoning regime.
103. Id. Professor Bronin further notes that several commentators “have argued that a
separate, specific solar ordinance is preferable.” Id. at 1245 n.112. For a more detailed discussion
of the two methods of solar zoning, see id. at 1246–47.
104. See id. at 1247 (citing particularly laudable elements of the Boulder plan).
105. The solar envelope creates a three-dimensional skyspace above a parcel in which no
construction or vegetation can legally occur. Id.
106. The solar fence is “a vertical plane along a property line that casts an imaginary shadow
that cannot be exceeded in length by the shadows cast by any building or tree on the neighboring
property.” Id.
107. S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, PROTECTING SOLAR ACCESS 4 (2012), https://sfenvironment.org/
sites/default/files/fliers/files/protecting_solar_access.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XL6-3PNH]. The size
of the solar fence changes between access areas. Id. In addition, Boulder has instituted newdevelopment siting requirements to ensure buildings are capable of supporting solar collection. Id.
108. See Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural
Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 100 (2011).
109. Rule, supra note 56, at 1264 (noting that the majority of recent scholarship suggests
communities are the “best choosers” in evaluating the costs and benefits of local adoption of
renewable energy); see Rule, supra note 50 (manuscript at 10) (“Because the significance of the
solar access problem varies dramatically across jurisdictions, the costs of implementing aggressive
solar access laws to address the problem are more justifiable in some communities than in
others.”).
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applications.110 Additionally, by generally restricting development,
zoning preserves solar access for future solar adopters.111
Each of the benefits associated with solar zoning, however, can
be reframed as an equally compelling downside. First, enhancing the
independence of local jurisdictions can pose significant costs to states
hoping to maintain a uniform solar policy.112 Indeed, as state
lawmakers make increasingly large financial and legislative
commitments in support of renewable energy,113 they may be hesitant
to entrust implementation to local governments. Significant changes
are likely necessary to ensure compliance with state-established
renewable energy targets,114 and if local communities are unwilling to
make the requisite investments, they can “undermine[ ] federal and
state efforts to promote sustainability, arguably imposing costs on the
nation and the world.”115
Second, broadly applied zoning ordinances may actually be less
fair than individualized determinations.116 By adopting a “one-size-fitsall” approach, a zoning regime may unnecessarily restrict development,
even where there is no present risk of solar obstruction.117 In such a
scenario, a municipality would bear the economic cost of restricted
development yet would fail to realize the full benefit of the ordinance
because many affected properties will never take advantage of the
provided-for solar protections.118
Growth restrictions also increase city housing costs and
compound urban sprawl.119 The implementation of height restrictions
and setback requirements leaves horizontal expansion as the only
110. S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 5.
111. Id. Restrictive zoning measures may also increase property values, an attractive
proposition for existing homeowners, by limiting the supply of available housing. See Rule, supra
note 56, at 1230–31 (discussing how sustainability measures that increase property values are
more readily embraced by citizens). Professor Rule draws on Professor William Fischel’s
Homevoter Hypothesis to frame the community reception to various green measures. For a
discussion of the Homevoter Hypothesis, see id. at 1228–29.
112. See Rule, supra note 56, at 1250 (arguing that the financial cost and time necessary to
align the estimated twenty-five thousand local zoning jurisdictions across the United States are
prohibitive).
113. See supra Section I.A for examples.
114. For an overview of some of these ambitious targets, see supra note 20.
115. See Rule, supra note 56, at 1235 (discussing siting issues).
116. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1249 (arguing that zoning ordinances may not account for
site variations and expressing concerns that landowners could be inequitably burdened, giving rise
to colorable takings claims).
117. S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 5.
118. Id.
119. See Rule, supra note 33, at 273 n.5 (“[Z]oning ordinances ‘limiting use, density, area and
height’ have caused ‘much greater sprawl than existed previous to [their] imposition[.]’ ” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Bernard H. Siegan, Smart Growth and Other Infirmities of Land
Use Controls, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 733 (2001))).
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viable development option.120 If solar zoning accelerates urban sprawl,
the negative environmental effects could offset any benefits
attributable to increased solar access.121 Finally, conventional zoning
does not usually result in the creation of tradeable property rights.122
This eliminates the potential for bargaining and precludes efficient
market transactions between neighbors. But perhaps more
importantly, it reflects the fact that solar access is not protected in a
meaningful way; zoning restrictions can be adjusted by granting an
exception or variance to a neighboring property or by amending the
zoning provision itself.123
C. Solar Easements
Given the risk that a broadly applicable zoning regime will be
overprotective of solar access rights to the detriment of desirable policy
goals, many jurisdictions simply allow neighboring property owners to
craft their own solar protections through negotiated easements.
Although state legislatures generally codify the existence of express
solar easements in an effort to avoid ambiguity, the free market often
controls the creation and disposition of such easements.124 Indeed, a
majority of states formally recognize solar easements and permit the
conveyance of these interests through voluntary, private
transactions.125 As compared to the approaches discussed previously, a
hands-off solar easement regime better protects property rights of both
solar adopters and their neighbors.126 Through voluntary bargaining,
the neighbor is able to sell her airspace entitlement to the solar adopter.
In the end, the solar adopter secures an unobstructed path to sunlight,

120. See id.
121. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1249 (“Comprehensive ordinances that create building
envelopes that enable the passage of light . . . may, in effect, mandate sprawl.”). See also supra
Section I.B for a discussion of the harmful effects of urban sprawl.
122. See Rule, supra note 56, at 1245 (“Rights held collectively by residents under zoning
restrictions are not ‘ordinary, property-rule-protected entitlement[s] that [residents] can alienate
to any willing buyer or on mutually agreeable terms.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting LEE ANNE
FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 72 (2009))).
123. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1249–50 (“Because it does not provide an enduring, secure
property right, zoning is among the least effective means of securing solar access.”); Dale D. Goble,
Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94, 123 (1977) (“In
addition to the lack of a property interest, another major impediment to the use of zoning to secure
solar access is the ease and frequency with which such ordinances are modified.”).
124. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1226 (discussing legislative recognition of solar easements).
125. See id. at 1226 & n.28 (providing an overview of state statutes that allow for the creation
and recording of express solar easements).
126. Id. at 1228 (noting that the parties “voluntarily bargain[ ] to a mutually agreeable
result”).
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and the neighbor is compensated for her encumbered airspace.127
Voluntary easements can also eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic costs
by concentrating the bargaining in private parties.128 Thus, in principle,
solar easements seem to be the preferred mechanism for protecting
solar rights.
Unfortunately, solar easements present practical concerns.
While many states explicitly allow for the creation of solar easements,
these statutes have been derided as an “inexpensive form of legislative
cheerleading.”129 In fact, there are no federal or state cases dealing with
express solar easements.130 The glaring lack of case law could indicate
any number of phenomena: that there was no demand for solar
easements in the first place,131 that easements are in place but have
generated no legal disputes, or that barriers to formation have
prevented voluntary easements from becoming a viable solution.132 The
third option—bargaining impediments—seems intuitive, given the
weight of scholarship addressing bargaining breakdowns in similar
settings.133 For example, the existence of a “bilateral monopoly” can
increase transaction costs because the parties are unwilling, as a result
of substantial prior investment, to walk away from the bargaining
table.134 Unlike in a competitive market, neighbors negotiating solar
rights are stuck with each other and cannot seek new deal partners. 135
Conversely, if the solar user needs to obtain entitlements from multiple

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1229 (quoting Donald N. Zillman, Common-Law Doctrines and Solar Energy,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY 25, 32 (John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence eds., 1981));
DuVivier, supra note 4, at 404 (same).
130. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1229 (conducting several searches of case law); see also S.F.
DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 7 (finding no examples where voluntary easements have
occurred). The author also conducted a search and similarly was unable to locate any examples.
131. See S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 2 (reporting that the San Francisco
Planning Department is only aware of a few cases in the city where new development has shaded
solar systems); see also MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, REAL ESTATE LAW 46 (9th ed. 2018) (citing recent
surveys finding that ninety-five percent of solar owners have not obtained protective easements).
132. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1229 (discussing potential transactional barriers to solar
easements).
133. For a general overview of impediments to voluntary Coasean bargaining, see Rule, supra
note 21, at 883–86.
134. Id. at 884 (“A ‘bilateral monopoly’ exists whenever two opposing parties’ ‘previous
investment in their present position [is] sufficiently substantial and irreversible’ such that
bargaining with each other is ‘a better solution than simply picking up stakes and moving
elsewhere.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law &
Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 298 (1992))); see also Klass, supra note 108, at 97 (“The
availability of solar easements may be limited, however, because they are voluntary in nature and
servient owners may overcharge because of bilateral monopoly problems.”).
135. Rule, supra note 21, at 884.
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neighbors, there is an incentive for one neighbor to hold out in an
attempt to extort a greater sum for her entitlement.136
Further, the cost of the easement may be so prohibitively high
as to deter bargaining altogether. These price pressures could be
attributed to the “endowment effect,” which occurs when an individual
demands an excessively high price because of an “irrational aversion to
losing a personally held entitlement.”137 Or, more likely,138 inflated
prices may simply reflect market realities. Although parties are free to
negotiate their own terms, the cost of an airspace easement is typically
the difference between the fair market value of the underlying
burdened property with and without the encumbrance.139
In urban settings, this difference is often massive. Because
vertical growth is frequently the only remaining option for developers
in crowded cityscapes, airspace can be quite valuable.140 Consequently,
the high-end market for air rights can place the cost of an easement far
beyond the solar adopter’s financial means.141 When air rights are
significantly more expensive than both the expected energy savings and
the cost of the solar collection system itself, it makes no economic sense
for a solar user to negotiate and purchase an easement.142 In other
136. For example, if the solar user needs to obtain three entitlements to ensure unobstructed
solar access, the third entitlement holder may be aware that the solar user has already invested
time and resources to obtain the first two. Since the solar array cannot function without all three
entitlements in place, the third right holder may demand a higher price because she knows she
holds the final piece to the puzzle. In practice, however, it is uncertain how often this scenario will
arise, if it does at all, since most solar users do not need to obtain solar access entitlements from
more than a small group of neighbors. Id. at 885 (discussing the holdout problem).
137. Id. at 885–86 (“An endowment effect is manifest when an individual’s irrational aversion
to losing a personally held entitlement causes the individual to demand an excessively high price
to sell it[,] . . . [which] can impede parties from reaching a Coasean bargain.”).
138. The endowment effect, while possible, is not anticipated to be an overly strong force in
negotiations over airspace rights. Id. at 886.
139. Larry J. Smith et al., Over and Under: A Practical Guide to the Condemnation of Aerial
Guideway Easements and Tunnel Easements, MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP 11,
http://www.millernash.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Z%20201.1%20-%20smith_beaver_white_
hiatt_dec2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/P2TZ-V9FX] (noting that the
valuation of easements is complex and difficult since there is generally no public market).
140. See Rule, supra note 50 (manuscript at 12) (“Particularly in densely-populated urban
areas, the airspace above land can be highly valuable . . . .”).
141. See S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 7–8:
In San Francisco, if a solar system owner were to compensate her neighbor for the lost
rights to develop his property[,] . . . she could easily pay many times more for the
easement than the cost of the solar system due to the high value of real estate and
development rights in the city.;
see also Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 915 (2009) (“For higher-density
areas, the compensation mechanism is more complicated.”).
142. A new residential solar system generally costs, after accounting for tax credits and other
incentives, between $10,000 and $30,000. Matasci, supra note 49. Comparatively, in 2016
developers in New York City paid an average of $292 per square foot for air rights in Manhattan.
Lois Weiss, City Saw Fewer, but Larger Air-Rights Deals Last Year, N.Y. POST (Feb. 7, 2017,
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settings, however, fair-market compensation may be economically
feasible.143 For example, if the area is low density or if the solar user
installs only a small panel, “compensation may be relatively small
because the award of a solar right might not actually create significant
burdens” for neighboring parcels.144 Similarly, if the easement only
restricts a relatively low-value use—such as vegetation growth or the
construction of a treehouse—the required compensation may be
minimal.145
Finally, even if obtained, an easement can still produce
inefficient outcomes. Easements are typically perpetual in nature,
unless the parties agree to a term of years or to termination upon the
occurrence of some other triggering event.146 Increased adoption of solar
easements could result in the piecemeal, long-term burdening of
property, leaving both property owners and local governments unable
to respond to changing land use needs and handcuffing their ability to
reallocate entitlements to more productive uses.147
D. Moving Toward a Liability Rule: The Iowa Model
As discussed in the preceding Sections, there are significant
flaws with the prior appropriation and solar zoning approaches.148 Any
benefits that accrue to landowners through the clear assignment of
airspace entitlements are lost when the interests of the burdened
10:12 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/02/07/city-saw-fewer-but-larger-air-rights-deals-last-year/
[https://perma.cc/54KC-YSWQ]. Certain areas, however, saw air rights trading for $750 to $800
per square foot, and the aggregate sum paid for Manhattan air rights in 2016 was $469,200,000.
Konrad Putzier, Manhattan Air Rights Got More Expensive in 2016, REAL DEAL (Feb. 8, 2017,
10:06 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2017/02/08/manhattan-air-rights-got-more-expensive-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/T36M-4SVU]. At those rates, a solar user requiring anything more than de
minimis protection would quickly be priced out of a market-rate solar easement.
143. See Bronin, supra note 141, at 914 (“Compensation schemes must necessarily differ
depending on the characteristics of the benefited and burdened properties.”).
144. Id. at 915.
145. Id. Of course, this assumes a market-valuation approach. In reality, the burdened party
may subjectively value her loss at a much higher rate, which could prevent the consummation of
an agreement. Id.; Bronin, supra note 56, at 1229 (noting that “[s]ervient owners may overcharge
for easements . . . because they overvalue their interests”).
146. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1226 (“These enforcement powers endure, and remain with
the land for subsequent purchasers, until and unless some event or condition renders them
unenforceable.”).
147. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of some alternative land uses that may produce
even greener results than solar energy installations.
148. Some states with property rule approaches have shifted somewhat toward a liability rule
system by establishing damages as the remedy for infringement. For example, statutes in
California and Wisconsin assign the initial entitlement to the solar user but provide that a
neighbor can pay damages to compensate for the reduced productivity caused by shading rather
than abandoning the conflicting use altogether. See Rule, supra note 21, at 860 (outlining the fourpart matrix of property and liability rules).
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property owner are undervalued or when an approach fails to provide
flexibility in addressing future environmental and land use issues.149
Although solar easements can help mitigate the former issue, the
associated transaction costs of voluntary bargaining “are too great for
policymakers to expect Coasean bargaining to consistently and
efficiently allocate competing airspace rights.”150
As an alternative, Iowa has statutorily created a liability rule
approach that is praised for being well balanced and considerate of both
solar adopters’ and neighbors’ property rights.151 First, like many other
states, Iowa allows property owners to voluntarily create solar
easements.152 Iowa’s statutory framework deviates, however, in its
resolution of breakdowns in the bargaining process. To limit the risk of
holdouts, Iowa authorizes local “solar access regulatory boards” to
unilaterally create easements across a neighboring property if the solar
applicant demonstrates his reasonable need for the easement and
affirms that he has attempted to negotiate for a voluntary
conveyance.153 In a particularly important departure from other models,
the Iowa statute mandates that a local solar access board, if it grants
an easement, require the successful solar applicant to compensate the
burdened property owner “based on the difference between the fair
market value of the property prior to and after granting the solar access
easement.”154 Unlike the systems adopted in Wisconsin,155 Wyoming,
and New Mexico, this compensation requirement ensures the solar user
will “only choose to compel such sales when the neighboring airspace at

149. See supra Sections II.A, II.B for a more detailed discussion of the downsides to these
approaches.
150. Rule, supra note 21, at 860–61.
151. See Bronin, supra note 56, at 1231 (“The Iowa approach reflects a sensible statutory
solution to the holdout problem.”); Rule, supra note 33, at 313 (“Iowa’s approach respects and
largely preserves landowners’ long-held airspace rights.” (footnote omitted)); Rule, supra note 21,
at 892 (“Iowa’s solar access statute as currently drafted goes a long way in balancing the goal of
promoting solar energy development against the airspace rights of Neighbors . . . .”). But see Klass,
supra note 108, at 115 (“[A] forced easement conveyance system, such as exists in Iowa, may run
risks that outweigh any benefits associated with greater solar development in the short term.”).
152. IOWA CODE § 564A.7(1) (2019) (“Persons, including public bodies, may voluntarily agree
to create a solar access easement.”).
153. Id. § 564A.4.
154. Id. § 564A.5. This compensation award must be deposited with the board by the owner of
the dominant estate within thirty days of the decision. Once the compensation is received, the
board will issue an order granting the solar easement. If the owner of the dominant estate declines
to deposit compensation, the board will not issue the solar easement. Id.
155. Wisconsin’s statute does not mandate compensation, but it permits local agencies to grant
the solar permit subject to a requirement that the solar user compensate the burdened party. WIS.
STAT. § 66.0403(5)(b) (2018).
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issue is best suited for solar access protection and other nonrival
uses.”156
Despite its positive traits, Iowa’s statutory framework is not
immune from criticism. First, the easements created by local boards are
perpetual in nature, which, as discussed in Section II.C, allows solar
adopters to “acquire more rights than are necessary to protect an
investment in solar collectors” and limits the flexibility of future land
use planning.157 In response, commentators have proposed
modifications158 to the Iowa approach that would incorporate an explicit
restriction on the length of the easement.159 These proposals are a step
in the right direction but do not go far enough. Even if an easement
regime incorporated the suggested modifications, the servient estate
would remain burdened for decades.160 Solar energy is a rapidly
developing technology, and future innovation might allow solar
collection in a manner that requires a smaller swath of unobstructed

156. Rule, supra note 33, at 314 (assuming both that the landowner is rational and that the
fair market valuations are correct). This helps to avoid some of the perverse overdevelopment
incentives that exist without forced compensation:
Such approaches promote solar energy development by motivating Solar Users to
install solar collectors quickly before Neighbors make use of the airspace needed for
solar access. They may also, however, encourage opportunistic landowners to install
solar panels with ulterior motives of acquiring a view easement across Neighbors’
property or of preventing or delaying Neighbors’ more productive uses. The rules might
also motivate Neighbors to overdevelop their properties with trees or structures to avoid
forfeiting their airspace rights to new Solar Users.
Rule, supra note 21, at 877–78 (footnote omitted).
157. Rule, supra note 21, at 893. Iowa does provide for the removal of a solar easement if the
servient estate applies to the local board or petitions the district court. Removal is warranted if
the solar collector is not installed and made operational within two years of recording the
easement, if the dominant estate owner ceases to use the solar collector for more than one year, or
if the solar collector is destroyed or removed and not replaced within one year. IOWA CODE
§ 564A.6(1).
158. In addition to durational limits, see infra note 159, these proposals also seek to simplify
or reduce ministerial requirements in an attempt to mitigate transaction costs. See, e.g., Rule,
supra note 21, at 892–93 (proposing that parties be allowed to describe the easement in a less
costly manner and that provisions be added to dissuade frivolous applications).
159. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 21, at 892–93 (proposing that the statute cap the term of the
access right to the life expectancy of the solar collector); Rule, supra note 50 (manuscript at 24)
(proposing that, unless terminated earlier, a solar easement created pursuant to the application
process should automatically terminate forty years after the date of recordation); Erik J.A.
Swenson, Model Solar Energy Access Legislation, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 5 (2010),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/us/images/publications/20100421SolarLegislation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM26-SDFM] (proposing that the easement terminate after twenty years of not
producing energy).
160. Even tying the duration to the life of the solar collector, see supra note 159, does not
significantly reduce the length of the burden, since a solar panel can last for approximately thirtyfive years. Warranty, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/energy/own/solar-panels/warranty
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3P92-WHTB].
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airspace.161 Echoing concerns over the potentially entrenching effect of
solar easements, Professor John William Gergacz has proposed that the
servient tenant be provided with a procedural right to “petition the
board for alteration of the easement . . . or for termination of all or a
part of the easement.”162
More fundamentally, whether the Iowa approach is in fact more
effective at addressing competing property interests remains to be seen.
It has been suggested anecdotally that the Iowa statute has led to some
voluntary solar easement agreements,163 but recent evidence is
noticeably hard to come by.164 Further, easements granted by a local
agency under a liability rule approach raise the same concerns as
voluntary easements—they may be cost prohibitive, especially in areas
with high property values.165 Thus, while the Iowa approach admirably
avoids the transaction costs associated with bargaining for voluntary
easements, its forced-compensation mechanism makes the prospect of
obtaining a solar easement economically unreasonable for many solar
users, particularly those living in dense cityscapes. Additionally,
perpetual easements may crowd out competing green land uses and
accelerate the harmful effects of urban sprawl. This program’s efficacy
as a means of encouraging renewable energy adoption may therefore be
limited, because any model purporting to resolve the key issues in the
solar access debate must prove workable in urban centers.

161. See Gergacz, supra note 70, at 34 (“Solar energy collection is a new technology; it may be
that the amount and location of open space needed for solar collection may change as new collection
devices are developed.”). Indeed, these technological shifts may be coming sooner rather than later.
Over the past few years, companies have introduced a variety of innovative solar collection objects,
including paint, windows, and roof tiles. See Patrick Caughill, A New “Solar Paint” Lets You
Transform Your Entire House into a Source of Clean Energy, FUTURISM (June 15, 2017),
https://futurism.com/a-new-solar-paint-lets-you-transform-your-entire-house-into-a-source-ofclean-energy/ [https://perma.cc/7666-MKGN] (citing research conducted at the Royal Melbourne
Institute of Technology that produced a paint that can generate clean energy from sunlight); Glenn
Meyers, Chicago Skyscraper to Generate Solar Electricity, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2011, 11:48 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS252721771420110328
[https://perma.cc/YNE2-RVN9]
(discussing an experimental program to install photovoltaic glass on the fifty-sixth floor of
Chicago’s Willis Tower); Solar Roof, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/solarroof (last visited Feb. 16,
2019) [https://perma.cc/LAX4-X9XD] (describing new product that incorporates solar collection
technology into glass roof tiles).
162. Gergacz, supra note 70, at 35. Under this proposal, the servient tenant would be required
to compensate the solar user for the loss of the easement or for costs associated with relocating or
modifying the solar collection device to conform to the terms of the modified easement. Id.
163. See Kenneth James Potis, Note, Solar Access Rights in Florida: Is There a Right to
Sunlight in the Sunshine State?, 10 NOVA L.J. 125, 142 n.130 (1985) (interviewing one of the
cosponsors of the Iowa solar access legislation).
164. The author was unable to find more contemporary evidence of solar easements directly
attributable to Iowa’s system of local solar access boards.
165. See supra note 142.
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III. THE AIR APPARENT: RETHINKING SOLAR PROTECTIONS
Society has a collective interest in promoting solar energy, and
mitigating airspace conflicts will be a critical component of any
successful policy.166 Yet current mitigation strategies often miss the
mark by failing to address roadblocks to solar access protection or,
conversely, by overprotecting solar collection at the expense of
neighboring landowners. These shortcomings167 are instructive in
designing a better framework: an effective solar access policy should be
adaptable to urban areas,168 compensate burdened property owners
without pricing out solar adopters,169 and have durational malleability
to avoid entrenching development restrictions.170 This Note proposes to
create such a system by pairing existing land use mechanisms—
namely, transferable development rights (“TDRs”) and call options—
and doing so within a liability rule framework.
First, Sections III.A and III.B frame the basic tools for this
proposal by outlining the structure of TDRs and call options,
respectively. Next, Section III.C discusses how these elements attach to
a liability rule framework to form solar development options (“SDOs”).
SDOs contemplate that after the solar adopter obtains an airspace
easement pursuant to the liability rule, the municipality will award the
burdened neighbor not only a TDR package but also a call option to
remove the easement prior to the end of its stated term for a
predetermined price. While local concerns will undoubtedly generate
structural wrinkles, the SDO proposal is still preferable to existing
approaches, as highlighted in Section III.D.
A. Transferable Development Rights
TDRs were first utilized in the early 1960s to aid in the
preservation of historic properties.171 Historic-landmark designation
foreclosed future development, which understandably created severe
166. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See supra Section II.B (discussing the sprawl-inducing effects of restrictive zoning).
169. See supra Section II.C (discussing cost concerns as a weakness of solar easements).
170. See Klass, supra note 108, at 115–16 (“[S]uch a forced easement system still may result
in creating fixed property rights that become obsolete or must be reconfigured to address changing
energy needs, technology development, or transmission development.”); Matuson, supra note 60,
at 868 (“[T]here is a danger that in protecting the solar access of a given property, redevelopment
will be discouraged in areas where times and community needs change requiring the possible
upgrading of densities to provide for greater economic as well as energy efficient use.”).
171. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917
(2016) (providing an overview of the creation of TDRs as part of New York City’s comprehensive
landmarks law); Matuson, supra note 60, at 853–54 (discussing the origins of TDRs).
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financial hardship for the owners of designated buildings.172 In
response, cities began awarding TDRs to the burdened properties. A
TDR is a development right—“the right[ ] the owner has to develop
unused space within the applicable zoning laws”173—that can be
transferred from the burdened property to a specially designated
receiving area.174 A developer in the receiving area who purchases a
TDR can effectively use the landmarked building’s unrecognized
development potential to build higher or denser than would otherwise
be permitted under existing zoning regulations.175 TDRs may fetch
steep prices on the open market, which can make them quite valuable
to the burdened property owner.176
Today, cities and counties nationwide employ TDRs to support
both historic and environmental conservation initiatives.177 This
increased popularity is unsurprising in light of the advantages a
municipality can accrue from a well-managed TDR program. First,
thoughtful designation of TDR receiving areas can complement both
existing zoning policies and future development goals.178 Consider a
municipality attempting to balance the competing interests of
development and preservation. A finely tuned receiving area can direct
development to specific lots in a way that broad zoning regulations
cannot: permitted TDR transfers expand a given lot’s development
potential without otherwise modifying the general zoning scheme

172. See Matuson, supra note 60, at 855 (“The designation as an historical landmark . . . might
result in the bankruptcy of a building’s owners.”).
173. Id. at 853.
174. See Serkin, supra note 171, at 918. The receiving area for the TDRs can often be quite
limited, and municipalities enjoy a good deal of freedom in setting the parameters of the transfer
program. Id. at 919.
175. See Matuson, supra note 60, at 853–54.
176. For example, TDRs in New York City sell for astronomical prices. Weiss, supra note 142.
In fact, one 2016 deal generated a price per square foot of $1,258. Id.
177. See, e.g., Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cty., to Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs, Miami-Dade Cty. (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.miamidade.gov/mayor/library/
memos-and-reports/2017/01/01.23.17-Report-Evaluating-Existing-and-Potential-DevelopmentDensity-Transfer-Programs-Directive-152550.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UQA-9LKU] (discussing
TDR programs in Miami); Memorandum from Daniel A. Sider, Planning Dep’t Staff, S.F. Planning
Dep’t, to Historic Pres. Comm’rs, S.F. Planning Dep’t (July 11, 2013), http://commissions.
sfplanning.org/hpcpackets/HPC_TDR_Packet_2013_07_11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M5T-CC4U]
(providing an overview of San Francisco’s TDR program for historic preservation); Providence,
Rhode Island, SMARTPRESERVATION, http://smartpreservation.net/providence-rhode-island (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BDL6-9NXJ] (discussing historic preservation TDR
program in Providence, Rhode Island); TDR Marketplace, KING CTY., https://www.kingcounty.gov/
services/environment/stewardship/sustainable-building/transfer-development-rights/marketinfo.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VR56-GNGX] (discussing the TDR
marketplace in King County, Washington).
178. See Matuson, supra note 60, at 872 (“[T]he use of TDR must coincide with a
comprehensive land use plan, since designated transfer districts would have to be provided.”).
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applicable to adjacent properties.179 The benefits of this tailoring can be
realized on a larger scale as well. For example, King County,
Washington, which includes the Seattle metropolitan area, operates a
countywide TDR program through which owners of rural “sending sites”
are able to sell their development rights to eligible urban “receiving
sites.”180 King County is thus able to create “more efficient development
patterns” by shifting growth “away from critical rural and resource
areas.”181
Second, the cost of awarding TDRs can be passed from the
municipality to the marketplace.182 That is, the government does not
pay the property owner directly; a TDR’s value wholly depends on what
private parties are willing to purchase it for on the open market. As a
result, TDRs can facilitate desirable land use outcomes, such as
environmental conservation, where the city would otherwise be
unlikely to engage in a cash transaction.183 Indeed, King County, listing
the benefits of its TDR program, proclaims that “[t]he County—and its
taxpayers—do not pay the high price to buy land outright.”184 But as
some commentators point out, TDRs are not truly “free.”185 While the
short-term burden may be minimal, residents bear future costs due
either to increased congestion in the receiving area or to inefficient
zoning undertaken to prop up the TDR regime.186 It also remains
unclear whether TDRs represent constitutional “just compensation” for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, since they provide
no fungible value to the property owner until exchanged in a secondstep transaction.187 While the Supreme Court has not squarely
179. See Serkin, supra note 171, at 919 (describing the famous Grand Central TDRs and noting
that the original receiving area was limited only to adjacent lots, though the area was subsequently
expanded to include twenty-one potential lots).
180. See Program Overview - Transfer of Development Rights, KING CTY.,
https://www.kingcounty.gov/services/environment/stewardship/sustainable-building/transferdevelopment-rights/overview.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/V5ZL-4H64]
[hereinafter Program Overview].
181. Id.
182. See Matuson, supra note 60, at 875 (discussing how “the developer’s market” could cover
the cost of the TDR).
183. See Serkin, supra note 171, at 926 (“TDRs are a kind of off-balance-sheet benefit that can
be created spontaneously at no obvious expense to the public.”).
184. Program Overview, supra note 180.
185. Serkin, supra note 171, at 926 (pointing out the hidden costs of TDR regimes).
186. Id. (noting that “there is little political accountability” associated with TDR creation,
which may lead governments to “give them away too freely,” since costs can be kicked down the
road). In fact, the need to maintain stability in the TDR program itself could produce adverse
effects. Because prices are correlated to both the number of receiving areas and the number of
TDRs outstanding, overissuance could depress prices. In response, a government could “impose
greater restrictions on the receiving area to enhance the value of the TDRs.” Id.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Serkin, supra note 171, at 917 n.21 (discussing the
“unresolved” question whether TDRs count as compensation or merely “blunt[ ] the regulation’s
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addressed the issue, its reasoning in Penn Central188 is generally
understood to support the proposition that TDRs can prevent a property
restriction from effecting an unconstitutional taking.189
B. Call Options
Liability rule approaches like Iowa’s promote entitlement shifts
by minimizing the high transaction costs associated with voluntary
bargaining. But even though liability rules largely avoid the potential
for impasse inherent in property rules, inefficient transfers can still
occur if the property owner’s subjective valuation of the entitlement is
not aligned with the appraised value of the entitlement shift.190 This
risk can be mitigated, however, by incorporating call options—the
option to purchase the legal entitlement at stake—into the
transaction.191 In fact, call options are already implicit in traditional
liability rules.192 To illustrate how the preliminary option works,
consider a prospective solar adopter in a liability rule jurisdiction like
Iowa. Initially, the legal entitlement to use the airspace belongs to the
neighboring property owner. But by unilaterally creating easements
upon application, Iowa’s scheme effectively creates a call option that the
solar adopter can exercise to “purchase” the entitlement for an amount
determined by the solar access regulatory board.

impact such that there [is] no taking”); Goble, supra note 123, at 128 (discussing potential
constitutional issues); Matuson, supra note 60, at 858–61 (analyzing the constitutionality of
TDRs). Indeed, there are also concerns that the issuance of too many TDRs could reduce the value
of existing TDRs or that subsequent zoning changes could undermine confidence in the system,
thereby further calling into question the compensatory value of this regulatory property. See
Serkin, supra note 171, at 926.
188. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
189. See Serkin, supra note 171, at 917 (“According to the Court, the landmarking of Grand
Central was not a taking, in part, because of the offsetting benefits that Penn Central received
from transferable development rights. . . . Because they were sufficiently valuable, the
landmarking did not effect an unconstitutional taking.”). But see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 747–48 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(characterizing the decision to put TDRs on the taking, rather than the just compensation, side of
the analysis as stemming from the “peculiarity” of the Takings Clause jurisprudence).
190. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2005). A liability
rule keeps parties from strategically overrepresenting their true valuations—thus blocking an
otherwise efficient transfer—by “allowing unilateral transfers at a price established by a third
party.” Id. Inefficiency is still possible, however, if the cost of the entitlement shift is set too low
by the third-party appraiser. In such a case, the original right holder would “lose her
entitlement . . . at a price that is far lower than her true subjective valuation.” Id.
191. Id. at 1404 n.14; see Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 731 (1996) (“A put is an option to sell, while
a call is an option to buy.”).
192. See Fennell, supra note 190, at 1404 n.14 (“[T]he party who is not originally assigned the
entitlement holds a ‘call option’ to obtain the entitlement at a price established by a third party.”).
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It is also possible to create a “higher-order” liability rule by
assigning a second option, contingent on the initial legal entitlement
changing hands.193 Here, the neighbor who had her original entitlement
“called” will in turn receive a call option to “retake” the entitlement for
a higher predetermined exercise price.194 Adding multiple levels of call
options can reshape a liability rule to more closely mimic an auction,
where each subsequent taking or retaking of the entitlement represents
a bid.195 By expanding the bargaining parameters, this regime enables
the parties to more effectively reveal their subjective valuations, which,
in turn, provides greater autonomy to decide how to allocate the
disputed entitlement between themselves.196
Professor Lee Fennell has considered options in the solar energy
context and proposed the creation of a solar “option exchange.”197 She
contends that governments can better facilitate voluntary solar rights
transfers by purchasing options from property owners who minimally
value their development potential, then selling those options to
property owners who highly value solar access.198 After purchasing an
option, the property owner would hold the right to exercise the option
and obtain a solar easement at a predetermined strike price.199 While
this innovative proposal may be attractive in some situations, it lacks a
mechanism for addressing property owners who place a high subjective
value on their air rights and accordingly refuse to convey a solar
easement to a prospective solar adopter. This scenario is particularly
worrisome in urban settings, where there is a much greater likelihood
that a solar adopter will need to obtain easements from multiple
property owners to secure uninterrupted solar access. In such a case, a
market failure is possible if one individual property owner holds out

193. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 191, at 715–16 (providing examples of higher-order
liability rules); Fennell, supra note 190, at 1407 n.32 (discussing the origins of the “callable call”).
194. See Fennell, supra note 190, at 1408 (providing an example of a callable call). It may be
possible to further mitigate the risks of “holdout problems and undercompensated transfers” by
forcing the parties to set their own exercise prices instead of relying on third-party appraisals. Id.
at 1407, 1433–44 (describing proposed Entitlements Subject to Self-Made Options, or “ESSMOs”).
195. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 191, at 711. This volley of options allows the parties to
inch closer to approximating their subjective valuations and steers the transaction toward a more
efficient outcome. Id.
196. See Fennell, supra note 190, at 1405 (arguing for greater information revelation in
transactions).
197. See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, art. 3, 2011, at 24–27.
198. Id.
199. Id. This proposal would also have ex ante benefits by enabling prospective solar users to
review, when considering a move to that particular locality, which properties have sold access
options. Id.
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and irrationally values her airspace in an attempt to extort abovemarket compensation.200
C. Solar Development Options: A Comprehensive Approach
This Part has so far focused on TDRs and call options as
standalone instruments. This Section combines these elements within
a liability rule framework and proposes the creation of SDOs. Like
Iowa’s liability rule approach, an SDO regime would vest a local body
with the power to unilaterally grant a solar easement after weighing
the necessity and reasonableness of the request.201 At this point, SDOs
deviate from the Iowa framework along a few key dimensions. First, the
solar easement in the SDO system would automatically terminate after
a predetermined number of years. While localities can exercise
discretion in limiting the easement’s duration, an average length of
fifteen to twenty years would suffice. This range would provide ample
time for most solar users to recoup their initial financial outlay, since
the typical solar payback period in the United States is between six and
eight years.202 Ultimately, the duration of the solar easement should
also be short enough to avoid overentrenching solar rights at the
expense of potentially beneficial development.203
The SDO system is further differentiated by its unique
compensation structure, which, like the Iowa approach, awards
payment to the owner of the encumbered neighboring property. But
SDOs go even further: they move the responsibility for compensation
from the solar adopter to the municipality itself.204 Instead of merely
calculating the compensation owed and serving as an intermediary for
the capital exchange, the municipal agency would award an allotment

200. See supra note 136 for a discussion of the holdout problem. But even absent a holdout
scenario, it could be appropriate to override the idiosyncratic preferences of an individual property
owner if the municipality determines that solar access is a beneficial public good.
201. In practice, this process could operate quite similarly to the Iowa system. See supra
Section II.D. Of course, parties should attempt to voluntarily bargain for an easement before
availing themselves of this system.
202. See How to Calculate Solar Panel Payback Period (ROI), ENERGYSAGE,
https://news.energysage.com/understanding-your-solar-panel-payback-period/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F9NA-AAFG]; supra note 159 (discussing proposals in favor of a longer
duration).
203. See, e.g., Matuson, supra note 60, at 872 (“Again, the ideal situation is not to freeze
development for all time, but to encourage and advocate the use of solar energy wherever
possible.”).
204. The solar adopter will, of course, incur some costs during this process. For example, it
would be reasonable to expect the solar adopter to pay for any necessary surveys and to be assessed
an application fee to defray the administrative costs associated with processing the solar easement
request.
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of TDRs to the burdened property owner.205 Under a typical TDR
program, the owner of the encumbered property receives a TDR
allotment equivalent in value to the property’s lost development
potential.206 When development is restricted in perpetuity (e.g., as a
result of historic preservation), the value of the TDR package must
account for the property’s permanent diminution in value. Under the
SDO system, however, the easement is only temporary in nature, so
development rights are not lost forever—they are merely “frozen” for
the duration of the easement.207 When valuing temporary easements,
the “rental return” method is most commonly used; as such, the
awarded TDRs would not reflect the full expected future development
potential of the encumbered airspace.208 Rather, the TDR allotment can
be conceptualized as an aggregated upfront payment reflecting the
“rent” for the duration of the easement.209
In addition to TDRs, the burdened neighbor would receive a call
option—a form of the “higher-order” liability rule210—that, if exercised,
would entitle her to reclaim the airspace entitlement at a
predetermined strike price.211 The strike price should be constructed to
include the total amount invested in the solar collection device, less the
value of the attributable energy savings. The strike price would
therefore decrease the longer the easement remained in place,
reflecting the diminished need to make the solar adopter “whole” once
he has realized an economic return on his investment. Further, at the
local board’s discretion, a standardized fee could be applied to help cover

205. The use of TDRs has been previously suggested, but this proposal charts a broader course
by adding call options and tailoring the approach for use in urban centers. See Goble, supra note
123 (proposing a TDR solar program in 1977); Matuson, supra note 60 (proposing a TDR solar
program in 1978).
206. See supra Section III.A (discussing the mechanics of TDRs).
207. Although structured as an easement, in some senses the encumbrance contemplated acts
more like a lease. As a result, the compensable value will be substantially less than under a
perpetual easement.
208. See, e.g., Portland Nat. Gas Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 195 F. Supp. 2d 314,
322 (D. Mass. 2002) (“A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a
temporary easement[,] and . . . [s]ome courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental
value of the property for the period of occupation.”); see also Troy Byers, Appraisal of Temporary
and Permanent Easements, AM. ASS’N ST. HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFICIALS 16,
http://sp.rightofway.transportation.org/Documents/Meetings/2015
Meeting
Presentations/
Appraisal of Temporary and Permanent Easements-GA-presented by Byers,Troy.pdf (last updated
Apr. 28, 2015) [https://perma.cc/M8LX-8YHC].
209. Because TDRs only have value when they can be bundled and sold, the allotment must
be made at the outset rather than on an incremental yearly basis.
210. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
211. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 191, at 713 (“[U]nder a higher-order liability regime, the
entitlement holder might have her entitlement taken at any time without her consent.”).

Landis_Galley (Do Not Delete)

1110

4/28/2019 3:12 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3:1075

the relocation of the solar panels to an unobstructed location or,
alternatively, fund the buy-in cost of a community solar project.212
Although the strike price would steadily decrease as a function
of the solar adopter’s cumulative energy savings, it would also increase
by the value of any TDRs not yet “earned” by the neighboring property
owner. If the initial TDR allocation is conceptualized as equivalent to
the net present value of the rental fees due over the entire life of the
easement, it is clear that a burdened property owner who exercises the
second-level call option and prematurely terminates the easement could
end up with a potential windfall. For example, if TDRs are awarded in
contemplation of a fifteen-year easement but the easement is removed
after only five years, the property owner would be compensated with
TDRs for ten years during which there was no actual encumbrance on
her property. Therefore, there is a risk that property owners will
attempt to double-dip by quickly selling their allotted TDRs before
prematurely terminating the easement, reclaiming their air rights, and
commencing development. In such a case, the property owner could
realize the full development potential of her airspace and also reap the
benefits from selling TDRs that were awarded to offset a burden she
never actually bore.
To avoid such an outcome, the value of the TDRs attributable to
the posttermination period can be incorporated into the strike price so
that the net compensation paid to the property owner reflects only the
time during which the easement was in effect. Thus, returning to the
previous example, the strike price would increase by the value of the
TDRs attributable to the remaining ten years of the easement.
Alternatively, if the TDRs have not yet been sold, the property owner
can elect to instead cede any “unearned” TDRs back to the
municipality.213 By structuring the entitlement in this manner, the

212. See S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 107, at 8–9. Community solar projects are cooplike arrangements through which individuals can purchase a portion of the power generated,
which they receive as a credit on their utility bills. See, e.g., S.F. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, COMMUNITY
SHARED SOLAR (2012), https://sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/fliers/files/community_shared_
solar.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAE7-42Z5] (discussing community solar in San Francisco); Jeff
Coltin, Reaching for the Sun: Cuomo Needs New York to Step Up Its Solar Act, CITY & ST. N.Y.
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/energy-and-environment/cuomonew-york-solar-act.html [https://perma.cc/F4UT-P5HF] (discussing community solar in New
York). Of course, the local board could also exercise its discretion to reduce the strike price based
on the totality of the circumstances. For example, if the solar panels in question are no longer
operable or the solar adopter’s expenses are suspiciously inflated, it would be proper to apply a
downward adjustment to the strike price. While extreme circumstances could justify a strike price
of zero dollars, this Note proposes that, at the very least, the price reflect an amount sufficient to
cover the administrative costs associated with the easement’s removal.
213. Mandating the return of unsold TDRs can help mitigate the fact that “governments may
already have a tendency to give them away too freely.” See Serkin, supra note 171, at 926. Indeed,
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municipality can be more confident that the owner of the burdened
property will only exercise the call option if there is a viable, profitable
development opportunity on the table—a tradeoff that should be
prioritized as net beneficial to the community at large. If no such
opportunity exists, the property owner should be content to hold and
sell her TDRs.214
D. The Comparative Advantage of SDOs
The core elements of SDOs—liability rules, TDRs, and call
options—improve upon existing solar access proposals and better
address the needs of solar adopters by focusing on urban centers,
balancing compensation rights against cost constraints, and preserving
land use flexibility.
First, SDOs can be effectively applied in densely populated
cityscapes.215 Existing approaches that require solar adopters to pay
full market value for easements render solar access protection dead on
arrival—the exorbitant cost of acquiring air rights in the urban core
prices out any solar adopter hoping to recoup his investment.216 The
SDO system avoids this problem by shifting compensation
responsibilities to the municipality through a TDR regime funded by
the developer market, at little upfront cost to the city.217
Second, SDOs compensate burdened property owners without
making solar easements cost prohibitive. It is now fairly well
established that landowners have property interests in their
airspace,218 yet many solar rights regimes seemingly overlook this
inconvenient fact.219 The SDO system, on the other hand, recognizes the
burdened neighbor and compensates her for the temporary
encumbrance of her airspace. Despite promising compensation, SDOs
are also structured to minimize the total cost of the program. As a
preliminary matter, many municipalities already have some form of a
TDR regime in place, which will reduce the administrative costs of
starting and maintaining the program.220 Developers are also familiar
oversaturation of the TDR market can lead to undesirable congestion in the receiving area or a
decline in the value of existing TDRs. Id.
214. Once the easement expires, the burdened property owner would again be free to use her
property as of right.
215. For a discussion on the importance of cities to the green movement, see supra Section
II.B.
216. See supra note 142.
217. See supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Section I.C.
219. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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with, and comfortable using, TDRs in these localities. Further, the
temporary nature of the easement reduces the number of TDRs that
must be provided to offset the encumbered landowner’s diminution in
property value.221 In fact, there may even be cases where easements can
be granted without issuing TDRs at all since TDRs only compensate for
unused development potential—if a building is already built to
permissible zoning limits, it will not have any additional development
potential to transfer.222
Although there may be some concern over the adequacy of TDRs
as a compensatory mechanism, the prevailing view accepts them as a
tool for offsetting the risk of takings liability.223 The Fifth Amendment,
however, requires not only the provision of “just compensation” but also
that the acquired property interest be “for public use.”224 Whether the
SDO program provides a public benefit is a much closer call. In contrast
to a broadly applicable regulation, solar easements only directly benefit
individual solar users. But given the immense importance governments
have placed on combating climate change, they may assert that “the use
of solar energy by a substantial number of individuals conveys benefits
to the public, including decreased reliance on foreign oil and decreased
pollution from the acquisition and burning of fossil fuel.”225 Despite
presenting novel legal considerations, this argument conceivably fits
within the Supreme Court’s fairly broad interpretation of the “public
use” requirement.226
Third, SDOs protect solar access rights while simultaneously
preserving land use flexibility. Notably, the backlash against urban
sprawl227 has left vertical growth as the best option for expanding cities.
If, as contemplated by other proposals, a solar adopter is granted a
perpetual easement, little can be done to terminate this easement
without his consent. Even though the community may be better off
permitting the solar adopter’s neighbor to build taller, the perpetual
easement unfortunately forecloses this beneficial alternative. In
contrast, SDOs not only cap the easement’s duration but also promote
early termination if an economically preferable option arises. They
221. This should help preserve the longevity of the program by limiting the number of new
TDRs issued. See Serkin, supra note 171, at 926.
222. If so, the solar adopter would be unlikely to even need the protection of an easement. If
the lot were upzoned, however, the solar adopter could initiate the SDO process.
223. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Gergacz, supra note 70, at 23 (“Statutory land use restrictions
based on the police power must be for the public benefit.”).
225. Gergacz, supra note 70, at 23.
226. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (holding that use of eminent
domain to further an economic development plan satisfied the “public use” requirement).
227. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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uniquely incorporate second-level call options that enable the original
entitlement holder (i.e., the burdened neighbor) to reclaim her airspace
rights at a set exercise price, thereby promoting efficient market
transactions and guarding against the entrenchment of inefficient land
use policies.
Further, municipalities can build on existing zoning enactments
to create “solar receiving areas” for the TDRs.228 The parameters of the
solar receiving areas are flexible and could be adapted to meet the needs
of individual municipalities. For example, a city could create receiving
areas in neighborhoods that, given existing shade levels, would not be
conducive for future solar adoption. Alternatively, receiving areas could
be used to encourage the development of other green projects—such as
large-scale solar installations—that current zoning restrictions might
otherwise preclude.229 An ambitious city could even forge a countywide
solar program that permits the transfer of solar TDRs between urban
and suburban stakeholders.230 Ultimately, this Note need not
enumerate the universe of possibilities; what matters is that
municipalities will have flexibility to design programs suited for their
individualized needs.
CONCLUSION
In the face of rising global temperatures, state and local
governments around the country have increasingly committed to
sustainable development and renewable energy sources, including solar
power. Solar devices, however, require unobstructed access to sunlight
and have consequently sparked airspace disputes between neighboring
property owners. Unfortunately, none of the current approaches are
particularly well suited for mitigating these disputes in an urban
setting, a glaring drawback given that sustainability efforts in densely
populated cities will be a focal point in combating climate change.
The SDO approach outlined in this Note aims to sustain the
positive elements of existing liability rule protections while adding
mechanisms—TDRs and call options—that better reflect development
228. See Goble, supra note 123, at 128 (proposing the sale of TDRs from residential areas to
commercial areas in order to enable greater development beyond a specified level of insolation).
229. Indeed, there is something pleasingly cyclical about this potential symbiotic relationship.
The development burdens required to support solar adoption in one area could be monetized and
sold to allow solar expansion in other areas. The transfer zones could also conceivably extend
countywide or statewide, though this would obviously require an enhanced degree of
intergovernmental cooperation. See TDR Marketplace, supra note 177 (providing an overview of a
countywide TDR marketplace).
230. For an example of such a countywide initiative, see supra notes 180–181 and
accompanying text.
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realities in urban centers and that more equitably balance the needs of
competing stakeholders. Indeed, the SDO system contemplates the
unilateral grant of an easement to protect the solar adopter yet respects
the neighbor’s airspace rights and compensates her with TDRs.
Further, through the combination of temporary easements and secondlevel call options, SDOs recognize solar adopters’ interests in recouping
their capital investments while simultaneously accounting for the risk
of potentially inefficient land use entrenchment. The fight against
climate change necessitates action now, and governments must provide
effective legal protections to facilitate widespread adoption of
renewable energy. The SDO system should, by no means, be the sole
method of encouraging solar access, but given the failure of current
approaches, SDOs’ future looks bright.
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